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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Chapter 35, Section 287(a) (“Marking Statute”), of the Patent Act of
1952 provides the following:
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling
within the United States any patented article for or under
them, or importing any patented article into the United
States, may give notice to the public that the same is
patented, either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the
abbreviation "pat.", together with the number of the patent,
or when, from the character of the article, this can not be
done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more
of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In the
event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered
by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on
proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and
continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages
may be recovered only for infringement occurring after
*
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such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall
constitute such notice.1
[2] The Marking Statute expressly limits the patent owner’s recovery of
damages if the patent owner, anyone making, offering for sale, or selling,
failed to mark its patented invention, being sold within the United States,
with the associated patent number. In these cases, damages must be
limited to those that accrue after the infringer is provided actual notice of
infringement. The authors suggest that, in light of relevant jurisprudence
and the purpose of the Marking Statute, owners of patents that are directed
to any business activities on the Internet should mark their own websites,
and require their licensees to mark their websites, with the relevant patent
numbers to avail themselves of constructive notice.2
II. BACKGROUND
[3] The first American patent statute did not contain a marking
requirement.3 The United States Supreme Court in Boyden v. Burke4
explained that all patents were public records and “[a]ll persons [were]
bound to take notice of their contents . . .”5 The first marking duty was
imposed by the Patent Act of 1842,6 which required all patentees and
assignees to mark each product sold with the date of the patent.7 Failure
to mark a product would result in a fine of “not less than one hundred
dollars.”8 The statutory penalty was eventually removed by the Patent Act
of 1861 which instead provided that “no damages shall be recovered” by
the patent owner unless there was constructive notice by marking, or
actual notice to the infringer.9 The Patent Act of 1927 changed the
required marking from the date of patent to the word “patent” and the
1

35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
Constructive notice, as used in this article, refers to notice of patent protection resulting
from affirmative marking of a patented article.
3
7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(7)(c) (2006) [hereinafter CHISUM
ON PATENTS].
4
Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. 575 (1852).
5
Id. at 582-83.
6
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1936).
7
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Act of
1842, 5 Stat. 543, 544).
8
Id.
9
Id.
2
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patent number.10 The Patent Act of 1952 codified the Marking Statute as
it exists today and states that the patentee can provide sufficient
constructive notice by abbreviating “patent” to “pat.” instead.11 The
patent owner is thus required by the Marking Statute to mark all patented
articles offered for sale in the United States in order to avail itself of the
constructive notice requirement and be able to recover damages as of the
date of infringement.12
[4] The purposes of the Marking Statute are to 1) help avoid penalizing
for innocent infringement; 2) encourage patentees to give notice to the
public that the article is patented; and 3) aid the public in identifying
whether an article is patented.13 Due to its public policy rationale, the
marking duty can be analogized to estoppel14 or reasonable reliance.15
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has
explained that marking is a form of “in rem notice to the world” of patent
protection,16 rendering the duty to mark a proactive measure imposed on
the patent owner.17 As such, knowledge of patent protection by an alleged
infringer is immaterial,18 and the patent owner is itself required to comply
10

See Carl Oppedahl, Patent Marking of Systems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 205, 210 (1995) [hereinafter Oppedahl] (providing an extensive discussion of
the history of the marking requirement).
11
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
12
See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed Cir.
1994) (explaining that a patent holder may recover damages on unmarked articles only
after either the infringer received actual notice of infringement or the filing date of an
infringement lawsuit).
13
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal
citations omitted).
14
See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 211 (explaining that when a patent owner fails to mark
a patented item “it may be understood to have led the public to believe that [the item] is
not patented, and thus cannot be heard to complain for damages if a member of the public
who has not been given actual notice of the patent chooses to copy the product.”).
15
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (holding
that where there is no marking present, the “public may rely upon the lack of notice in
exploiting shapes and designs accessible to all.”).
16
Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
17
Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187 (citing Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1894)
holding that notice “is an affirmative act, and something to be done by [the patent
owner].”).
18
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (agreeing with Amsted, 24
F.3d at 187 that “it is irrelevant…whether the defendant knew of…his own
infringement.”).
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with the Marking Statute and is also required to police compliance by its
licensees.19 Lack of marking does not constitute an affirmative defense
but limits the recovery of pre-notice damages.20
III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE MARKING STATUTE ON THE INTERNET
[5] The Marking Statute states that a patent owner can satisfy the notice
requirement by either providing constructive notice by marking its
“patented article” with the relevant patent number21 or by providing actual
notice “of the infringement” to the infringer.22 It expressly states that
where actual notice of infringement has not been provided, “[f]iling of an
action for infringement shall constitute such notice.”23 Thus, the statute
provides that a patent owner “is entitled to damages from the time when it
either began marking its product in compliance with section 287(a) or
when it actually notified [the accused infringer] of its infringement,
whichever was earlier.”24 It is widely accepted that marking is not
required when neither the patent owner nor its licensees produce the
patented article25 or when the patent-in-suit is only directed to a process or
a method,26 because in both situations there is “nothing to mark.”27
19

CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(ii) (citing a myriad of cases at n. 130
to support the conclusion that the patent owner must supervise those acting “under
[him]”); see also Amsted, 24 F.3d at 185 (explaining that “[a] licensee who makes or sells
a patented article does so ‘for or under’ the patentee, thereby limiting the patentee’s
damage recovery when the patented article is not marked.”).
20
Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 769 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); accord
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
25
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 (1936); see also
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that
even though Wine Ry. interpreted a predecessor to the current Marking Statute, it applies
to the modern statutory counterpart).
26
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538 (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc.,
346 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (distinguishing cases where the patent-in-suit contains
both method and apparatus claims from those where the patent-in-suit contains only
method claims, and holding that where the patent-in-suit contains only method claims
and the infringing product is made using the patented method, the Marking Statute does
not apply to limit the patent owner’s recovery of damages).
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Patents dealing with activities on the Internet can take the form of a
system,28 software,29 business method,30 or combination thereof.
A. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE BY MARKING
1. WEBSITE IS THE PATENTED ARTICLE
[6] When a website is expressly included in a patent claim, it functions as
a direct limitation on the scope of the patent. The Federal Circuit has not
had the opportunity to determine whether a website can constitute a
patented article. However, case law indicates that when given the
opportunity, the Federal Circuit will likely hold that a website that is
expressly claimed in the patent-in-suit constitutes a patented article under
the Marking Statute and must be marked to satisfy the constructive notice
requirement and not limit the recovery of damages.
[7] The Marking Statute expressly requires any “patented article” to be
marked.31 Absent direction from the Federal Circuit,32 district courts have
held that the determination of whether an article “embodies” a patent and
constitutes a “patented article” parallels an inquiry into whether an article
infringes a patent.33 Such an inquiry requires a two-step analysis.34 First,
27

Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538.
See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 223 (suggesting that complex, possibly geographically
dispersed, systems that combine several patented items, both method and apparatus,
should be marked by patent numbers corresponding to every patent containing apparatus
claims in order to comply with the marking requirements of § 287 (a)).
29
See State St. Bank & Trust Co., v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a computer “programmed with…software [ ] admittedly
produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’” and is “statutory subject matter, even if
the useful result is expressed in numbers….”).
30
See id. (explaining that when an innovative business method meets the statutory
requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness, it may be protected under the
patent law as any other process or method).
31
35 U.S.C. § 287 (a) (1999).
32
John LaBarre & Xavier Gomez-Velasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your Patented Software!,
12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 37 (2005) [hereinafter LaBarre & Gomez-Velasco] (stating
that the Federal Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to address what constitutes a
“patented article” under the Marking Statute).
33
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D. La. 1992);
see also Clancy Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (D. Colo.
1997) (stating that “one test for determining whether a product is a ‘patented article’
28
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all claims in the patent-in-suit must be construed in a Markman hearing to
determine their scope and meaning.35 Second, the properly construed
patent claims must be compared to the article in question to decide
whether the claims cover the article.36 As a question of fact, the second
prong of this test is to be left to the trier of fact.37
[8] By analogy, the test of whether an article is covered by the patent-insuit and constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking Statute,
requires the court to ask if the article had been produced or sold by
someone other than the patentee or its licensees, “would it directly and
literally infringe the independent claims of the patent.”38 This inquiry
looks to the relationship between the article in question and the patent-insuit.39
[9] Based on the foregoing discussion, when a website is expressly
disclosed in, or otherwise falls within the scope of one of the patent
claims, it acts as a limitation on the scope of the patent and constitutes a
“patented article.”40 In this situation, the language of the Marking Statute
makes clear that the patent owner and its licensees must mark such a
website with the relevant patent numbers to avail themselves of the
benefits of constructive notice and to be capable of recovering damages as
of the date of infringement.
2. THE WEBSITE IS NOT THE PATENTED ARTICLE
[10] The Federal Circuit has rendered several arguably conflicting
decisions relating to the marking duty as it applies where the patent-in-suit
does not claim the article or website in question. The question then
under section 287(a) is to ask whether the product would infringe the patent if sold by an
unauthorized party.”).
34
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
35
Id.; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
36
Id.
37
Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
38
Laitram, 806 F. Supp. at 1296; see also Clancy, 953 F. Supp. at 1173.
39
Broadcom Corp. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 04-CIV-2416, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18163,
*9-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2004) (following Clancy and Laitram in applying the two-part
“patented article” test).
40
35 U.S.C. § 287 (a) (1999).
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becomes what conditions must be met to trigger the marking duty in
relation to a website even though the website is not the “patented article.”
The Federal Circuit has announced several possible solutions. The most
recent Marking Statute case decided by the Federal Circuit, Sentry
Protection Products v. Eagle Manufacturing Co.,41 did not overrule or
distinguish any of the following cases and each can presumably support a
valid legal argument.
I.

NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO MARK WHEN ONLY METHOD CLAIMS ARE
FOUND INFRINGED EVEN THOUGH THE PATENT MAY CONTAIN BOTH
METHOD AND APPARATUS CLAIMS

[11] One line of cases holds that the Marking Statute does not apply
where only process or method claims are being asserted because there is
no “patented article” that satisfies the requirements of the statute. For
example, in Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area,42 Hanson was awarded a
patent covering a method and apparatus for making snow used in winter
sports and licensed its use and development to Snow Machines
Incorporated (“SMI”).43 One competitor, Hedco, Inc., sold snow-making
devices that used Hanson’s patented method to Alpine Valley Ski Area,
Inc. (“Alpine”) without a license or permission from Hanson.44 The
district court held that Hanson’s patent was valid and infringed by
Alpine.45
[12] On appeal, Alpine argued that Hanson was precluded from
recovering damages for the infringement prior to the filing of the lawsuit
because Hanson’s licensee, SMI, did not mark the devices that it sold with
the patent number.46 Judge Friedman noted that even though Hanson’s
patent contained both apparatus and method claims, the only claims found
infringed, after claim construction and relevant comparison, were directed
to a method.47 The Federal Circuit cited its recent decision in Bandag,
Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., when holding that the notice requirement of
41

Sentry Prot. Prods. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
43
Id. at 1076.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1082.
47
Id. at 1083.
42
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the Marking Statute did not apply to limit the recovery of damages where
only process or method claims were found infringed.48
[13] Similarly, in Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl,49 Devices for
Medicine sued Boehl for infringement of three patents disclosing and
claiming apparatus and methods of using introducers to insert medical
devices into the human body.50 On appeal, Judge Markey did not engage
in a full discussion of the marking requirement51 but agreed with Hanson
that where a patent contains method and apparatus claims, notice under the
Marking Statute is not required where only method claims were being
asserted.52
[14] Based on Hanson and Devices for Medicine, marking of a website is
presumably not required when it is not the “patented article” itself but
merely uses an asserted process or method claimed in the patent-in-suit.
The Federal Circuit based its holding in both cases on the well-established
principle that the Marking Statute does not limit the recovery of damages
when the patent-in-suit is directed at a process or method.53 Mere use of a
patented method does not produce a website, and as such, does not bring it
within the language of the Marking Statute. Both cases are still good law,
as Hanson was recently cited with approval in State Contracting &
Engineering Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc.,54 for the proposition that the
Marking Statute does not apply when only process claims were found
infringed and the patent contained apparatus claims.55

48

Id. (citing Bandag Inc. v. Gerrad Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
50
Id. at 1063.
51
The Federal Circuit found that Devices for Medicine failed to preserve its objection to
damages for appeal. See generally id.
52
Id. at 1066; see also Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 221 (stating that marking is not
required when only method claims are asserted, but where apparatus claims are being
asserted, the apparatus needs to be marked).
53
See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text; see also LaBarre & Gomez-Velasco,
supra note 32, at ¶¶ 11-12.
54
State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
55
Id.
49
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II. NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO MARK UNLESS A PATENT CONTAINS BOTH
METHOD AND APPARATUS CLAIMS AND A TANGIBLE ITEM THAT HAS BEEN
PRODUCED BY THE INFRINGED METHOD CLAIM EXISTS

[15] Another line of cases suggests that where a tangible item is not
claimed in the patent-in-suit, but is produced by a claimed method in the
patent, it sufficiently constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking
Statute even though it is not the patented invention itself. Instructive on
point, in American Medical Systems v. Medical Engineering Corp.,56
American Medical Systems, Inc. (“AMS”) and Medical Engineering Corp.
(“MEC”) were both “vigorous competitors” in the development,
marketing, and sale of penile prostheses.57 AMS developed and received a
patent claiming a new “apparatus and method for packaging a fluidcontaining penile prosthesis in a pre-filled, sterile state.”58 The claimed
method resulted in a packaging configuration referred to as the “wet pack”
and was advantageous to the older dry-pack packaging system.59 At the
same time, MEC was also working on its own method of creating a wet
pack for its own prostheses.60 During a trade show, MEC personnel saw
AMS’s packaging and replicated the package’s design.61 After finding
that MEC had infringed AMS’s patent, the district court limited AMS’s
recovery of damages for lost profits to those incurred after the filing of the
lawsuit due to an initial failure to mark in compliance with the Marking
Statute.62
[16] On appeal to the Federal Circuit, AMS argued that the district court
improperly limited its recovery of damages.63 AMS argued that it was not
required to mark its “wet pack” under the Marking Statute because it only
asserted a method claim at trial.64 Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge
Michel analyzed relevant precedent and held that:

56

Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1528.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1530.
63
Id. at 1538.
64
Id.
57
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The purpose behind the marking statute is to encourage the
patentee to give notice to the public of the patent. The
reason that the marking statute does not apply to method
claims is that, ordinarily, where the patent claims are
directed to only a method or process there is nothing to
mark. Where the patent contains both apparatus and
method claims, however, to the extent that there is a
tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted
method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it
intends to avail itself of the constructive notice provisions
of section 287(a).65
This pronouncement suggests the possibility that the Federal Circuit is no
longer convinced that the Marking Statute does not apply to claims
directed at a process or method in any situation and in all circumstances.
The difficulty with Judge Michel’s often cited American Medical Systems
directive is that if a patent contains both apparatus and method claims,
marking a tangible item that implements or provides access to a claimed
method, but is not the claimed apparatus, may be deceptive and even seen
as an implicit limitation on the scope of the patent.66 Another drawback
inherent in marking an item that is not the “patented article” is that such
marking has no direct connection to the patent itself. This lack of
connection may give rise to implications of false marking under Section
292 of the Patent Act.67 Although the requisite intent to deceive the public
can be negated by a showing of goodwill to provide public notice of patent

65

Id. at 1538-39 (emphasis added).
See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 216 (suggesting that a patent owner may argue that
marking a non-covered product may “amount[] to an admission regarding the scope of
the claims of the patent.”).
67
35 U.S.C. § 292 (2007); Professor Chisum explains that the Patent Act prohibits three
types of false marking:
(1) counterfeit marking (i.e. use of a patent mark
without the patent owner’s permission); (2) false
patent marking (i.e. the use of a patent mark on an
unpatented article); and (3) false patent pending
marking (i.e. the use of ‘patent applied for’ or ‘patent
pending’ when no patent application covering the
article is in fact pending)
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(vii).
66
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protection,68 this added risk may be a deterrent for some patent owners
who are unwilling to engage in litigation.
[17] However, the careful wording used by Judge Michel in American
Medical Systems suggests that this potential risk may have been foreseen
and addressed. The Federal Circuit found that AMS was required to mark
its “wet pack” with the patent-in-suit because it was a “physical device
produced by the claimed method that was capable of being marked.”69
This language implies that the court was looking for a nexus between the
asserted method of a combination patent and a tangible item that is
connected, by means of its creation, to the asserted method. After this
nexus is established between the tangible item and the asserted method,
the tangible item is treated as a “patented article” under the Marking
Statute and must be marked to provide constructive notice. Several recent
district court opinions dealing directly with website marking have relied
on American Medical Systems to reach the same result.
[18] The first case to directly address whether a website is a tangible item
for the purposes of the Marking Statute was Soverain Software L.L.C. v.
Amazon.com, Inc.70 Soverain alleged that Amazon.com had infringed
three patents by operating websites that included virtual shopping carts to
conduct e-commerce.71 All three patents-in-suit contained both method
and apparatus claims.72 Amazon.com argued that Soverain failed to
produce evidence that any of its thirty-two licensees marked their websites
with the relevant patent numbers.73 Soverain argued that a “website is an
intangible object” that does not have to be marked.74 Judge Davis
explained that “[w]hen dealing with a patent that includes method and
apparatus claims, a tangible item that can be marked is required to be
marked.”75

68

CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(vii).
Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added).
70
Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
71
Id. at 906.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 909.
74
Id.
75
Id. (citing Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538 for support).
69
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[19] Recognizing that the case fell under the Federal Circuit’s holding in
American Medical Systems, the court defined a website as a tangible item
because “tangible item[s], as used in American Medical Systems, [are]
those items that can be marked and intangible items [are] those that cannot
be marked.”76 Although not expressly discussed, the facts and holding
suggest that the court treated the licensees’ websites as the apparatus
indicated in the patents-in-suit for implementing the method claims. Since
the websites were tangible items capable of being marked, the holding
treated each website as a “patented article” under the Marking Statute.
[20] The same decision was reached by the district court in IMX, Inc. v.
LendingTree, L.L.C.77 IMX asserted infringement of its patent covering
an interactive “method and system for trading loans in real time” where
loan applications were stored in a remote server database and could be
accessed through a website.78 IMX created IMX Exchange software that
could be accessed by lenders and brokers through a website.79 The
website was not part of the claims and thus not the patented invention
itself.80 IMX argued that unlike Soverain, its website did not practice the
patent but was just the means through which the IMX Exchange software
could be accessed.81 Judge Robinson held that while the website is not the
patented invention, it “is intrinsic to the patented system and constitutes a
‘tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted method can be
given.’”82
[21] Soverain and IMX stand for two propositions. First, a website is a
tangible item that is capable of being marked to provide public notice.83
Second, a website that is not the patented invention itself but is intrinsic to
the patented invention constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking
Statute and must be marked to provide constructive notice of patent

76

Id. (first alteration in original).
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C., No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179
(D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005).
78
Id. at *3-4.
79
Id. at *4.
80
Id. at *9.
81
Id.
82
Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
83
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
77
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protection.84 Stated another way, a website that is created to provide
access to, or allow users to interact with the patented invention, is intrinsic
to the patented invention and constitutes a “patented article.” This logic
echoes the “produced by” and nexus requirements implied in American
Medical Systems.85
[22] The intrinsic test used in IMX is also supported by the express
language of the Marking Statute authorizing the marking of packaging that
contains one or more patented articles when marking of the article itself is
impossible due to its character.86 Using the facts in Soverain and IMX as a
base, when the patent in question is directed to a system that is comprised
of multiple elements, some tangible and some intangible,87 a website that
incorporates or was created to provide access to the patented invention can
be reasonably analogized to packaging that contains “one or more”
patented articles.88 When marking of a tangible item, such as the remote
server in IMX, is possible but would not provide sufficient public notice as
required by the statute due to its inaccessibility to the public, marking the
packaging will be sufficient.89

84

See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
See IMX, Inc. v. Lending Tree, LLC, No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33179, at *12, n. 4 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005) (“There is no meaningful distinction between
a patented method that results in a product that can be marked [produced by] and a
patented system that results in a service implemented through an Internet-based website
that can be marked [nexus].”) (brackets added for emphasis).
86
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
87
See IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33179 at *3-4, 9 (noting that the patent-in-suit
contained both method and system claims covering a system comprised of a “unique
interactivity” to occur over the Internet, loan database, and remote transaction server); see
also Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904, 906 (The patentsin-suit “describe a network-based sales system that includes a buyer computer, a
merchant computer, a payment computer, and a virtual shopping cart.”).
88
See Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Sondra Mfg. Co., 579 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1978)
(suggesting that custom of the trade should be considered when determining whether
marking of the packaging is sufficient, and indicating that marking of the package rather
than the “fashion hosiery” socks themselves was sufficient to satisfy the marking
requirement under § 287).
89
See Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“[M]arking
of the package may sufficiently comply with the [marking] statute when there is some
reasonable consideration presented for not marking the article . . . or . . . marking the
article itself would not provide sufficient notice to the public.”).
85

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 1

[23] The Federal Circuit in State Contractors & Engineering explained
that the court should not search for some tangible item capable of being
marked when the patent-in-suit contains only method claims.90 Marking is
only required in connection with some fabricated article.91 Moreover,
Hanson and Devices for Medicine are not at odds with the “produced by”
limitation of American Medical Systems. Hanson and Devices for
Medicine addressed situations where the tangible items were not produced
by the asserted methods but merely used those methods. Under the
holdings of both cases, marking is not required when a website is only
using the patented method, even though the website is a tangible item.92
Under American Medical Systems, Soverain, and IMX, when the website is
produced by the patented method or is developed exclusively to provide
access to the patented invention, it is intrinsic to the patented system and is
treated as a “patented article” under the Marking Statute because of its
close nexus to the patented system.93 The American Medical Systems

90

See State Contr. & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (“We have
not previously held that a patent containing only method claims is examined to see if
something could have been marked in order to assess whether the notice provision
applies, and we decline to do so now.”).
91
Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (relying on
Wine Railway to hold that marking is only required in connection with some fabricated
article), overruled in part on other grounds by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1319-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
92
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
93
See supra 69, 83-85 and accompanying text; see also Halliburton Servs. v. Smith Int'l,
Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725-726 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (relying on American Medical
Systems to require marking when the patent owner asserted patents that contained both
method and apparatus or system claims and “distributed tangible items created by the
[patented] methods and by which [the patent owner] could have given notice of [patent
protection].”) (emphasis added); accord Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 312
F. Supp. 2d 649, 651-52 (D. Del. 2004) (finding that where a tangible item is produced
by an asserted method in a combination patent, and the tangible item is capable of being
marked, it must be so marked to comply with American Medical Systems and the
Marking Statute); accord Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
2d 257, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that when a patent owner produced a physical
item by the asserted method on which it could have given notice of patent protection,
compliance with the Marking Statute was required); accord Inline Connection Corp. v.
AOL Time Warner, 465 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that when a service
provider distributed a patented system where the only tangible item was a wall jack
specifically designed for the patented system, the wall jack was intrinsic to the patented
system and should have been marked to comply with the Marking Statute).
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opinion does not overrule Hanson or Devices for Medicine, but rather
builds on their rationales.
3. SUFFICIENCY OF MARKING
[24] Once a duty to mark is established, only full compliance with the
Marking Statute will avail the patent owner of constructive notice. The
Marking Statute provides that the patented article itself, or, if marking the
article itself cannot be done, the packaging where the article is contained,
is to be marked.94 Marking must consist of “the word ‘patent’ or the
abbreviation ‘pat.’ together with the number of the patent”95 and must be
legible and accessible to an interested person.96 However, the location of
marking is something that “must be left to the judgment of the patentee.”97
[25] The Federal Circuit, in American Medical Systems, explained that
neither the express language nor legislative history of the Marking Statute
imposes any time limit by which marking must begin in order to avail the
patent owner of damages prior to the date of the lawsuit.98 Judge Michel
noted that once marking begins, the policy purpose of the Marking Statute,
to provide public notice of patent protection, has been satisfied and
damages are no longer limited.99 The court construed the Marking Statute
to “preclude recovery of damages only for infringement for any time prior
to compliance with the marking or actual notice requirements of the
statute.”100 It further found that a mere “delay between issuance of the
patent and compliance with the marking provisions of section 287(a) will
not prevent recovery of damages after the date that marking has begun.”101
Therefore, once marking of a website has begun, it must be consistent
throughout all webpages and establish a nexus between the patent and the
patented system to satisfy the Marking Statute.
94

35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
Id.
96
See Trussell Mfg. Co. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 50 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding
that marking so fine that a magnifying glass is required to read it does not provide
“sufficient notice to the public.”).
97
Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892).
98
Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F. 3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
95
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“SUBSTANTIALLY ALL” REQUIREMENT

[26] To assure compliance with the Marking Statute, substantially all
websites of the patent owner and its licensees that constitute a “patented
article,” expressly or by relation, must be marked. In American Medical
Systems, the Federal Circuit cautioned that “once marking has begun, it
must be substantially consistent and continuous in order for the party to
avail itself of the constructive notice provisions of the statute.”102 The
consistent and continuous requirement is met when the patent owner and
its licensees mark all patented articles made and no longer distribute
unmarked products.103 When the patent owner or its licensees mark, but
do not distribute the marked articles, the notice requirement has not been
satisfied.104 However, the Federal Circuit in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,105
has recognized the difficulty a patent owner may encounter when ensuring
compliance by its licensees. The court held that where the failure to mark
is not caused by the patent owner, but rather by its licensees, whether
marking was “substantially consistent and continuous”106 will be
determined by a “rule of reason,”107 under which the court must inquire
into whether the patent owner “made reasonable efforts to ensure
compliance with the marking requirement.”108
[27] Although an omission of marking from any substantial number of
distributed products constitutes noncompliance,109 it has been suggested
that omission of marking from a relatively small number of patented
articles made and sold might be dismissed as de minimis.110 Guided by

102

Id.
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Maxwell v.
J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
104
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538; Nike, 138 F.3d at 1446.
105
Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1111-12.
106
See id. (relying on Am. Med. Systems, 6 F.3d at 1538 to support its holding).
107
Id.
108
Id.; see also Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner, 465 F. Supp. 2d 312, 323
(D. Del. 2007) (citing Maxwell to support the application of the “rule of reason”).
109
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537.
110
See Hazeltine Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 20 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.N.Y. 1937)
(interpreting the predecessor to § 287(a), Revised Statutes, § 4900, to require “marking of
every patented article sold -- subject, of course, to the implied exception of de
minimus.”);
103
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equity, the Federal Circuit in Lisle Corp. v. Edwards,111 took the position
that the policy of the Marking Statute does not require the marking of
every patented article ever sold or distributed when such compliance
“would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible.”112 However, “[w]here
the public finds marking or writings upon the article itself, the public
should be able to rely upon the fact that a patent, if it exists, should also be
noted with that writing.”113
[28] While the “rule of reason” applies to provide additional protection to
the patent owner when its licensees fail to mark a tangible item,114 it
should not be relied upon. To take advantage of the rule, the patent owner
would have to show that it licensed its patent many times, making it
unable to reasonably enforce marking by all licensees. However, in the
context of a website, the patent owner will likely be unable to make such a
showing due to the ease of accessibility and indexing of websites in
general, and the fact that it is very easy to mark a website with the relevant
patent numbers.115 As such, the patent owner should police compliance
with the Marking Statute by all of its licensees in order to satisfy the
“substantially consistent and continuous” standard announced in American
Medical Systems and its progeny.116
II.

NEXUS REQUIREMENT

[29] The nexus requirement for finding a tangible item intrinsic to a
“patented article” finds its way into the sufficiency of marking. The
purpose of the Marking Statute is to prevent innocent infringement by
accord Maxwell v. K Mart Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1336 (D. Minn. 1995) (citing
Hazeltine to hold that an “implied de minimis exception protects the patentee whose
compliance with the marking statute is nearly perfect.”); accord CHISUM ON PATENTS,
supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(iii), n. 151 (citing numerous cases to support the same
proposition).
111
Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
112
Id. at 695.
113
Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Cf. Creative
Pioneer Prods. Corp. v. K Mart Corp., No H-83-4137, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13474, at
*14-15 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding that marking on a product’s packaging was insufficient
to comply with the Marking Statute where the product had text embossed on its handle).
114
See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
115
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
116
See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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providing public notice of patent protection.117 Sufficient notice must
inform the public that a certain tangible item is covered by the listed
patent.118 Such is the purpose of marking the “patented article” with
“patent” or “pat.” and the relevant patent number.119 This requirement
implies that a nexus must exist between the “patented article” and the
patent. Since a website consists of several webpages linked together,
avoiding ambiguities requires that a marking note all relevant patents and
either provide a clear and consistent statement of patent protection, or
provide a more generalized patent statement covering the website as a
whole.
[30] Consistency was addressed in IMX,120 where IMX, as the patent
owner, identified its patent on its “Patent”121 and “Patent Press Release”122
webpages within the IMX Exchange website. Both webpages mentioned
the IMX patent by reference and not by number, but used “IMX
Exchange” to refer to the corporate entity and not to the patented
system.123 Additionally, the term “patented technology” was used to
describe a “unique loan information and real-time trading system” on one
117

Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Sys., Inc., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (stating that the
purpose of the Marking Statute is to provide “in rem notice to the world” of patent
protection).
119
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
120
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C., No. Civ. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 WL 3465555 (D. Del.
Dec. 14, 2005).
121
The statement on the “Patent” webpage provided:
118

IMX(R) Patents
IMX Exchange was awarded a patent in late 1999 for
our unique loan information and real-time trading
system. This was a milestone for IMX Exchange. We
are pleased that the Patent Office has recognized the
technology innovations created by our developers,
and envisioned by our founder, Steve Fraser.
Patent Press Release
Id. at *2.
The webpage “identifies the [patent-in-suit] patent by number and describes ‘the IMX
Exchange invention [as] provid[ing] a method and system for trading loans in real time.’
In the same document, ‘IMX Exchange’ is described as an ‘Internet-based, business-tobusiness trading network.’” Id. at *3 (alterations in original).
123
Id. at *3.
122
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of the webpages,124and the same term was mentioned in connection with a
“patented pricing technology” and not the IMX Exchange product on the
other webpage.125 The court held that since the language on the two
webpages was inconsistent as far as what fell within the scope of the
patent-in-suit, IMX failed to provide public notice that its “IMX
Exchange” system was protected by the patent-in-suit.126 The IMX
decision suggests that had IMX used consistent language to describe the
scope of its patent, or had it provided a more general patent statement, it
would have satisfied the requirements of the Marking Statute.
[31] General patent statements have been permitted by the courts for a
long time. This middle ground between no notice and highly detailed
notice has been held to be sufficient to establish the requisite nexus and
satisfy the Marking Statute. In Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes
Tool Co.,127 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that marking a
“patented article” with a statement that it was covered by “one or more of
the following patents,” followed by several patent numbers, was sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement.128 This view has been endorsed by the
Federal Circuit and a recent district court decision.129 In Amsted

124

Id. at *2.
Id.
126
Id. at *4.
127
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1951).
128
See id. at 626 (holding that marking a device as “patented by ‘one or more of the
following patents’ followed by the numbers of the patents in suit, and others not presently
in controversy” was sufficient to satisfy the Marking Statute). Even though the decision
predates the formation of the Federal Circuit, it is still good law. See infra note 129 and
accompanying text (holding that marking a tangible item with a statement that it is
covered by “one or more of the following patents” was sufficient to create the requisite
nexus and provide sufficient public notice).
129
See Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (affirming, in a suit for false patent marking, that a label stating that an item
“is manufactured under one or more of the following U.S. Patents, or under one or more
Patents Pending . . . and list[ing] thirty or so patents” was not deceptive in any way and
provided sufficient public notice of patent protection); accord Mass. Inst. of Tech. v.
Abacus Software, Inc., 5:01CV344, 2004 WL 5268123, *20 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2004)
(citing CHISUM ON PATENTS, in turn citing Chicago Pneumatic, to “permit a listing of
multiple patents with a statement that the article is covered by ‘one or more’ of those
patents” as not intentionally deceptive under § 292, or false marking, and providing
sufficient public notice of patent protection).
125
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Industries Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,130 the Federal Circuit
explained that the policy goal of the Marking Statute is to encourage the
good faith effort to provide public notice.131 When the only tangible item
available is not, or cannot be, treated as a “patented article,” the patent
owner is not required to mark.132 However, the patent owner can assure
its own compliance with the Marking Statute by marking items as “for use
under U.S. X,XXX,XXX”133 or by requiring its licensees to mark items as
“licensed under U.S. X,XXX,XXX.”134
[32] It is possible to provide a clear and consistent statement of patent
protection, as suggested by IMX.135 However, given the ever-developing
nature of websites and associated technologies, it appears more practical
for the patent owner and its licensees to provide a more general patent
statement that the website as a whole is covered by “one or more of the
following patents.”136 This middle ground approach is generally accepted
and avoids unnecessary difficulties inherent in the more detailed patent
statements. Even though a general statement provides a more blanket
intellectual property statement, it does not implicate the false marking
provisions of the Patent Act as long as the statement is provided as a good
faith effort to provide public notice of patent protection under the Marking
Statute.
B. ACTUAL NOTICE TO THE INFRINGER
[33] The Marking Statute provides that when the patent owner or its
licensees fails to mark as required, “no damages shall be recovered . . . in
any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified
of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter….”137 Thus,
sufficiency of notice focuses on whether the patentee’s actions were
sufficient to provide notice and “not on what the infringer actually

130

Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings, Co., 24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. (citing Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
136
See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
137
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
131
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knew.”138 Proper notice of infringement “must therefore come from the
patentee, not the infringer.”139 It is also established that notice from a
party “closely associated” with the patent owner, such as a distributor,
does not satisfy the Marking Statute because only the patent owner has the
statutory right to exclude others.140
[34] Absent marking, the actual notice requirement is satisfied when the
accused infringer “is notified, with sufficient specificity, that the patent
holder believes that the recipient of the notice may be an infringer.”141 In
Amsted, the Federal Circuit explained that a letter notifying the entire
industry, including the infringer, about the patent’s existence and
ownership was insufficient to provide the requisite notice, absent a
specific accusation of infringement.142 Proper notice “requires the
138

See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(knowledge of the patent by the infringer is irrelevant to the finding of sufficient actual
notice under the Marking Statute); see also Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings,
Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the “correct approach to determining
notice under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee, not the knowledge
understanding of the infringer.”).
139
Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also
Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that
“[a]bsent notice, [the infringer’s] ‘knowledge of the patents’ is irrelevant. Section 287
requires ‘proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement.’”) (emphasis added).
140
Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that
endorsing a rule of notice where a party closely associated with the patent owner could
provide actual notice under § 287 would require courts to “decide the degree of
association sufficient to satisfy the rule.”). The court reasoned that:
[b]esides alerting the alleged infringer to avoid
further infringement, the notice requirement also
permits the alleged infringer to contact the patentee
about an amicable and early resolution of the
potential dispute. Thus, without knowledge of the
patentee's identity, an alleged infringer may lose the
benefit of this primary purpose of the notice
requirement. An alleged infringer may lose the
opportunity to consult with the patentee about design
changes to avoid infringement. Similarly, without
knowledge of the patentee, an alleged infringer may
lose the chance to negotiate a valid license.
Id.
SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
142
Amsted Indust., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
141
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affirmative communication of a specific charge of infringement by a
specific accused product or device.”143 The actual notice requirement is
satisfied when the accused infringer “is informed of the identity of the
patent and the activity that is believed to be an infringement….”144
However, the Federal Circuit recognized in SRI International, Inc. v.
Advanced Technology Laboratories, Inc.,145 that actual notice may come
in “numerous possible variations in form and content….”146 Thus, the
proposed course of action the patent owner is demanding, “whether the
[patent owner] threatens suit, demands cessation of infringement, or offers
a license under the patent,”147 is irrelevant.
[35] Where the patent owner was required to mark its website with the
relevant patents, but failed to do so, actual notice case law requires the
patent owner, and the patent owner alone, to notify the infringer of patent
protection and the allegedly infringing activity.148 While the Federal
Circuit has stated that notice does not have to propose a particular
resolution to the infringement in order to satisfy the Marking Statute,149
notice must nonetheless be of infringement and not mere patent ownership
and scope.150

143

Id.; see also Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470; accord Amsted, 24 F.3d at 188, n. 5 (suggesting that the
requirements of the Marking Statute are satisfied “where the infringer acknowledges a
specific communication to be a notice of infringement.”); accord Ceeco Mach. Mfg., Ltd.
v. Intercole, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 979, 986 (D. Mass. 1992) (stating that the express
language of the Marking Statute does not require actual notice of infringement to include
the same information required for marking: the word patent and the patent number).
145
SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470.
146
Id.; see also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that “offering of a license is [sufficient] actual notice” under the Marking
Statute).
147
SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470.
148
See 35 U.S.C. 287(a) (1999); Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.2d 1320, 1327-28
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187; Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523,
1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Devices for Med., Inc. v. Buehl, 833 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
149
See SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470; Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 1577.
150
See Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001); SRI Int’l., 127 F.3d
at 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187; Ceeco Mach. Mfg., Ltd., v. Intercole,
Inc., 817 F.Supp. 979, 985-86 (D. Mass. 1992).
144
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IV. EXAMPLES OF WEBSITE MARKING
[36] In order to assist understanding of the issue involved and show actual
compliance with the Marking Statute, the authors provide several
examples of website patent marking. These statements have not been
tested in litigation, however the authors suggest that these examples
constitute sufficient marking, under the legal discussion above, because
they clearly provide public notice of patent protection.
A. BUY.COM
[37] Buy.com is an online shopping depot.151 At the bottom of its
homepage and every other webpage, Buy.com provides a link to its
“Terms of Use” which contains the user “Terms and Conditions.”152 In
paragraph 18 of the Terms and conditions, Buy.com provides the
following intellectual property statement:
No delay or failure to take action under this Terms of Use
shall constitute any waiver by Buy.com of any provision of
this Terms of Use. . . . One or more patents may apply to
this Web site, including without limitation: U.S. Patent
Nos. 5,528,490; 5,761,649; and 6,029,142.153
B. A9.COM
[38] Search engine A9.com, like Buy.com, provides a “conditions of use”
link on its homepage, and every other webpage.154 Following this link
takes the user to the Conditions of Use, which users accept by visiting
A9.com. In the “Patents” section, A9.com provides the following
intellectual property statement:
One or more patents apply to this site and to the features
and services accessible via the site, including without
151

Buy.com, http://www.buy.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
Id.
153
Buy.com, Company Information, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.buy.com/corp/legal.asp
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
154
A9.com, http://www.a9.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
152
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limitation: US Patent Nos. 6,006,225; 6,144,958;
6,185,558; 6,401,084 and all corresponding foreign
counterparts. This site may include technology licensed
from Amazon.com, Inc. or one of its affiliates.155
C. AMAZON.COM
[39] Online superstore, Amazon.com, includes a very detailed statement
of patent protection on its “Conditions of Use” webpage. The interested
user can find the “Conditions of Use” link at the bottom of every webpage
that falls within the Amazon.com website.156 In the “Patents” section,
Amazon.com provides the following intellectual property statement:
One or more patents apply to this Site and to the features
and services accessible via the Site, including without
limitation: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,715,399; 5,960,411;
6,006,225; 6,029,141; 6,064,980; 6,144,958; 6,169,986;
6,185,558; 6,266,649; 6,317,722; 6,360,254; 6,366,910;
6,401,084; 6,466,918; 6,489,968; 6,606,619; 6,853,982;
6,853,993; 6,912,505; 6,917,922 and all corresponding
foreign counterparts. Portions of this Site operate under
license of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,708,780; 5,715,314;
5,909,492; 6,205,437; 6,195,649; 5,717,860; 5,712,979;
5,819,285; 6,782,370; and 5,812,769.157
D. MERCEXCHANGE
[40] MercExchange, e-commerce solution provider, has one of the more
detailed intellectual property statements that the authors have found. By
clicking on the “About Us” link on the left-hand side of the homepage,
and following the “Solutions” tab at the top, MercExchange provides a
listing of eight patents, the scope and summary of the patent, the patent
155

A9.com, Website Conditions of Use, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.a9.com//company/tou.jsp.
156
Amazon.com, http://amazon.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
157
Amazon.com, Conditions of Use,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/105-60146725618849?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
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number, and a link to the pdf version of the issued patent. One example is
provided below.
Method and Apparatus for Using Software Search
Agents to Locate Items in Electronic Markets. This
patent relates to a method of using software search agents
to locate items in electronic markets or electronic auctions
around the world. The ‘176 patent claims describe a system
consisting of multiple electronic markets and electronic
auctions interconnected over a computer network such as
the Internet. The software search agent may be provided
item identifying information and initiate requests to other
electronic market or electronic auction to determine
whether the item sought is available for purchase at such
electronic markets or electronic auctions. Item information
maintained in data repositories associated with the
electronic markets or electronic auctions is obtained by the
software search agent and collected for later use, such as
for presenting the item search results obtained to Internet
users. Patent Number: 6.085,176158
E. OTHER EXAMPLES
[41] Some companies like Friendster.com, Priceline.com, and uBid.com
do not provide such comprehensive and complete patent statements. At
the bottom of every page included in the website is a brief patent
statement:
Friendster.com:
U.S. Patent No. 7,069,308 & 7,117,254, and 7,188,153.159
Priceline.com:
U.S. Patents 5,794,207; 5,897,620; 6,085,169; 6,510,418 and
6,553,346.160
158

Mercexchange, Solutions, http://www.mercexchange.com/solutions.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007) (clicking on the underlined “Patent Number” link takes the user to a pdf
copy of the issued patent).
159
Friendster, http://www.friendster.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
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uBid.com:
Protected by U.S. Patent Nos. 5,845,265; 6,202,051; 6,266,651 and
pat. pending.161
[42] However, even these patent statements should be sufficient to
provide public notice as is the underlying purpose of the Marking Statute.
V. CONCLUSION
[43] Based on the foregoing discussion, the authors suggest that patent
owners should mark all Internet websites that use, implement, or provide
access to the patented technology.162 Websites are tangible items that are
capable of being marked.163 When a website merely uses a patented
method and the same website is not “produced” by the patented method,164
presumably marking is not required because there is nothing to mark.165
However, there is the possibility that a court will find that a website is
“intrinsic” to the commercial embodiment166 or implements the patented
method, and as such, can be treated as a “patented article” under the
Marking Statute.
[44] Patent owners should also require their licensees, as a part of the
licensing agreement, to mark websites that practice the patents167 and take
160

Priceline.com, http://www.priceline.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
uBid.com, http://www.ubid.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
162
See Sandra P. Thompson, Committee No. 757 -- Special Committee On Patents and
the Internet, Subcomm. E., available at
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/annualreport05/content/0001/COMMITTEE%20NO%20757.pdf (rejecting member-proposals that the marking
statute be amended to include exceptions for Internet and other technology-related
patents).
163
See Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F.Supp.2d 904, 909 (E.D. Tex.
2005); IMX, Inc., v. Lending Tree, LLC, No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33179, at *12 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005).
164
See Am. Med. Sys., Inc., v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179, at *9, 11, 12 n. 4.
165
See Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538; State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am.,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
166
See 35 U.S.C. 287(a) (1999); Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 158, 162
(N.D. Ill. 1992); IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179, at *12.
167
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999) (extending the marking duty to those “persons making,
offering for sale, or selling” the patented article).
161
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reasonable steps to police compliance with the Marking Statute.168 Such
agreements combined with reasonable efforts to police compliance may
allow the court, as in Maxwell, to find that failure to mark by licensees is
not conclusive on the “substantially consistent and continuous”169
requirement. Licensing agreements should also provide for a cause of
action against the licensee in the instance that it fails to mark a website
and this lack of marking is the proximate cause of reduced damages.
[45] If there is no constructive notice, the patent owner itself will have to
provide actual notice of infringement to the accused infringer or file an
infringement lawsuit.170 Actual notice must be a specific charge of
infringement and not just a statement of mere ownership.171 The proposed
resolution to the infringement, be it a license, a threat of a lawsuit, or a
cease and desist demand, does not effect the sufficiency of notice as long
as the accused infringer can determine from the actual notice what activity
the infringing charge is based upon.172
[46] Under such circumstances, another option for the patent owner is to
only assert method claims at trial.173 While method claims may provide
less protection than apparatus claims, 174 this is one possible way for the
patent owner to avail itself of damages for infringement. However,
asserting only method claims in a combined patent may be risky. This is
based on the potential likelihood that the court will find that since the
patent contains both method and apparatus claims, the website in question,
a recognized tangible item, can be treated as a “patented article” and

168

See Am. Med. Sys. 6 F.3d at 1537; Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693, 695 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Rutherford, 803 F.Supp. at 163.
169
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111-12 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
170
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999) (stating that where there is no constructive notice,
damages cannot be recovered until actual notice, where actual notice may take the form
of “[f]iling of an action for infringement….”).
171
See Amsted Indus. Inc., v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
172
Id.
173
See supra Part III (A)(2)(i).
174
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1312-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding that method claims cannot be infringed when one step of the patented method is
performed outside the US).
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should have been marked. 175 Additionally, asserting only method claims
when marking was otherwise required but not provided may lead to a
result that is at odds with the purpose of the Marking Statute.176 While a
patent owner has complete discretion as to which claims to assert at trial,
such election should not allow the patent owner to circumvent his marking
duty.177
[47] Marking websites with patent information also makes economic
sense. If constructive notice of patent protection is provided by marking,
damages are calculated from the date of infringement178 and the patent
owner can recover damages for infringement committed over the past six
years,179 absent other considerations.
On the other hand, when
constructive notice is not provided, the patent owner can only recover
those damages that occurred after actual notice, notification of
infringement, or filing of the lawsuit.180 However, it is likely that
infringing activity will stop once conclusive notice of infringement is
received, and the only remedy available to the patent owner would be an
injunction.181

175

Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 257, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that where a combined patent covers a tangible item, as well
as method claims, the patent owner is “not relieved of the duty to mark simply by
asserting only the method claims of the patent.”).
176
See Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187.
177
See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 221 (suggesting that the patent owner should not be
able to escape his marking duty by simply asserting process or method claims at trial).
178
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999).
179
Id. § 286 (2007).
180
Id. § 287(a) (1999).
181
Id. § 283 (2007).

28

